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ABSTRACT
This paper outlines the contribution made by Locke to the economic analysis of the
status of women. Locke's contribution, it is argued, is fundamental to the development of the
economic discipline's analysis of women's role in society. His work both undermined the
theological determinism that had previously dominated intellectual debate and also laid open the
path down which subsequent economic analysis was to progress.

In the history of economic thought John Locke is acknowledged as one of the more
important of those contributors to pre-Smithian economics who helped to lay the philosophical
foundations upon which the general principles of political economy were to be subsequently
constructed. He is also perceived as having made a number of direct contributions to the
development of political economy particularly in the area of monetary economics and property
theory (Vaughn 1980; Mitchell 1986). The purpose of this paper is to show that Locke should
also be given credit for pioneering research into both the economics of the social position of
women and of the study of the economic relationship between husband and wife.
Locke developed his analysis of relations between the sexes and between spouses as a
consequence of his involvement in the seventeenth century debate over the innate rights of
human beings versus the divine rights of the monarchy. This contextual point is critical for both
explaining why Locke took up the issue of women’s relationship to men and why his argument
took the form that it did. Ashcraft (1986) has shown that to comprehend Locke's work it is
critical that the context in which he wrote be understood, for this context greatly shaped not
only what he wrote about but also his manner of dealing with particular topics. His writings on
gardening, for example, written while in exile in Holland if taken at face value are not
significant historically. When they are read as Ashcraft suggests they should be, i.e. as coded
communications between conspirators hatching plans for regicide, however, they take on an
entirely different meaning and significance. Because of the importance of context in Locke's
work it is necessary to specify in some detail the environment in which he made his
contribution to the economic analysis of women's social position.
The Dissenters, Whigs and radicals who populated the movement challenging the
regent's right to monopolise political power in seventeenth century Britain, argued that state
power was not founded on birth and divine will as claimed by the Royalists. Rather, they
insisted that there existed a 'social contract' between the head of state and the people which
gave regents the right to govern the nation so long as they used their power to protect and
advance the interests of the people. The consent theorists argued further, that the original
contract of government which specified the nature of the relationship between the people and
the state had been forged while the population remained in a state of nature, this being a stage

in the development of human society in which there existed no government. In such a
society people existed in a state of equality initially owning the world in common with all
who were rational, being free of any natural domination by any other. A rational human
being was an individual who had the capacity to comprehend natural law. This was the
highest form of law and

was that which prevailed

irrespective of the existence of

government being law which must exist if the world was to be compatible with the will of
God (Grotius 1925:38-39).
The Royalists replied to the arguments of the consent theorists by insisting that no
matter how regents behaved the people did not have the right to question their wishes because
the powers of a regent were divine in origin. In support of this claim they advanced an
argument which was a mixture of biology and scripture. It was argued that biologically, God's
commitment to regal absolutism was proven by the fact that God had created humans in a
biological form which meant that they necessarily came into the world as beings who were
dependent on and hence subject to their parents. As the Royalists' reading of the relationship
between Adam and Eve, as revealed in the book of Genesis, convinced them that God had
decreed that husbands had the right to expect unquestioning obedience from their wives it
followed that the father was the senior parent within the family. This meant that children, while
bound to honour both their parents, owed their primary allegiance to the will of their fathers.
Paternal authority was therefore natural and divine in origin in that subordination of wife to
husband was decreed by God and subordination of child to father was grounded in a nature
which God had created.
As all individuals were bom as natural subjects of their fathers, the Royalists argued,
there could never have been a time when individuals were sufficiently independent of the will of
another to have made possible the forging of a freely entered covenant of government. The true
foundation of states, therefore, could not be any voluntary agreement between people and
regent. Rather, it was the God-given paternal power that existed within the family, the people
of a nation being no more than the members of an extended family the head of which was
entitled to all the rights due to husband and father within the home.

Of the absolutist authors whose publications influenced the debate on relations
between state and people through the second half of the seventeenth century, Robert Filmer was
the most significant historically. Filmer's most important contribution to the debate was the
observation that consent theory was seriously flawed because it could not provide an adequate
explanation for how mankind could have ever have held the supposed meeting which forged the
original covenant of government. He observed that if all people in the state of nature were equal
in status because God had given mankind the world to be owned in common, then it was
necessary that all should have partaken in the original decision to divide the world into separate
states. No individual or group of individuals has the right to take or give away another's Godgiven natural rights and clearly dividing the world into separate states and privately owned lots
infringed the individual's natural law right to share in the common ownership of the earth. The
only acceptable way this could have been be done was if every one had met together and agreed
to take these steps. Such a meeting being physically impossible Filmer concluded that in fact it
had never been held and that consequently the claim that there existed an original contract of
government to which all mankind had freely consented was farcical. He also concluded that if
this was the case then the consent theorists' refusal to acknowledge the divine nature of regal
power left them with no other explanation for the origin of government, authority and private
property than the fact that some individuals had in the past forcibly usurped the natural rights of
others. Consent theory, therefore was a licence for the free use of force and for anarchy (Filmer
1969:267).
Filmer's work was published in the midst and as part of a political struggle, in which
both Royalists and consent theorists were striving to win support from a property enfranchised,
male electorate. This fact is important for understanding why Filmer's critics went to great
effort both to deny that they had no defence for private property and to discuss the status of
women in relation to men. The first was necessary to disabuse those who feared that to break
the link between regent and God would undermine the sanctity of property and the second to
placate the fears of those who suspected that breaking this link would undermine the power of
husbands. The reason this second issue was a difficulty was because the consent theorists'
method for undermining belief in the divine nature of the King's powers was to deny that Adam

had enjoyed supreme regency of the world. They argued that a rational reading of the Bible
made it clear that even in the Garden of Eden, Adam had not enjoyed the powers of an absolute
ruler because his powers had been shared by Eve. This point was critical because if it could be
sustained then the very foundations of absolutism would be seriously undermined. The
problem, however, lay in the fact that it followed that if Eve had not been subject to Adam's
absolute authority then husbands could not have inherited the divine right to rule their wives
that they claimed God had given Adam. Such a suggestion had the potential to be electorally
disastrous in a society in which virtually all men accepted that they had the right to be treated as
absolute regents within the confines of their own homes. Certainly, telling men that there was
no moral or theological foundation to this claim was hardly likely to be a positive factor
attracting these individuals to the political alliance the consent theorists were attempting to build.
Filmer's work then, was a challenge to the consent theorists in that it both undermined
their claim that the foundation of state power lay in the people's will and it laid them open to the
charge that they had no defence for property rights. It also made clear that regents in theory
drew their power from the same source as did husbands and that if one denied that the King had
inherited absolute power to rule the nation from Adam it was also necessary to deny that
husbands had inherited an identical power within the household. To attack the rights of regents,
therefore, was to attack the rights of husbands. A reply to this multifaceted challenge which
would be an effective propaganda instrument aiding the creation of a strong electoral, indeed
revolutionary alliance, therefore needed not only to refute Filmer's scriptural evidence but
needed to do so in a manner which was consistent with natural equality, a disproportionate
distribution of the world's wealth amongst mankind and which preserved men's authority
within the home. All this, moreover, had to be done in a manner which was consistent with
consent theory but without the requirement that all humanity had once held a meeting and freely
decided these arrangements. It was the challenge of constructing an argument that could
simultaneously deal with all these numerous interlocked issues that Locke chose to take up in
the early 1680s. Because these issues were so integrally interwoven, comprehending the nature
of Locke's explanation of women's social position requires an understanding of his
contribution as a whole. Only when one has this overall picture does it become possible to

comprehend both where women fit into the argument and the manner by which Locke was led
to advance certain conclusions as regards their relations with men.

Locke and the Divine Origin o f Regal Power
In his reply to Filmer, published as Two Treatises on Government, Locke sought
first, to deny the divine origin of regal power and state absolutism. Second, he sought to
disabuse those who feared that to accept that political power was founded in the will of the
people would leave no substantive justification for private property or for political and
household authority. Locke began by attacking the claims that the regent's powers were divine
in origin and absolute in extent. To achieve this objective he engaged in a painstaking scriptural
analysis of Filmer's work. By undertaking this exegetic endeavour he was able to argue
convincingly that the claim that God had given sole regency of the world to Adam, when he
initially created the universe, was based on a selective and literal rather than a comprehensive
and rational reading and use of scripture. Locke observed that the Bible utilises the plural word
'them' when stating to whom dominion of the earth was initially given by God. As utilised, he
suggested, this word could either refer to Adam and Eve together or it could be a reference to all
members of the human race. Locke (1969:25-26) acknowledged there was ambiguity here but
he insisted what was not ambiguous was the plurality of the term 'them'. To whomever
ownership of the world was given, the use of the word 'them' made clear, it was not given to
Adam alone. Adam therefore could not have been given absolute power by God when the
world was first created for he had to share his power with at least one other. Locke added,
moreover, that the significance of the plurality of the original grant of dominion could not be
dismissed merely by observing that Eve was Adam's subject. Even were she to some extent
subservient to Adam this would not mean that Adam's powers were absolute because the Bible
explained that Eve 'was not so subjected to him as to hinder her dominion over the creatures, or
property in them' (Locke 1969:26). For Locke this meant that even if one were to acknowledge
that Eve was Adam's subject, a claim he did not accept, then at the very minimum it would be
necessary to also acknowledge that she was a subject with a great deal of power in her own
right and thus Adam's powers were not absolute.

Locke made explicit his acceptance of the fact that Adam had no God-given right to
dominate Eve when dealing with the claim that at the time of the Fall, God decreed that
henceforth Eve must be subject to Adam's rule. In response to this assertion Locke observed
that when Adam and Eve were being driven from Paradise both were being punished and
therefore it was unlikely that God would have chosen this moment to elevate Adam to absolute
ruler of the world. It was true that Eve was subjected to a greater punishment than was Adam
because she had aided in his temptation as well as sinning herself and that this greater
punishment accidentally give Adam a 'superiority' over Eve. Locke denied however, that what
Adam was accidentally receiving, by being subjected to a lesser punishment than Eve, was a
divine right to rule over her. Rationality, he insisted, made it clear that when God said to Eve 'I
will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children,
and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee (cited by Locke 1969:37)' he
was not granting Adam any authority over Eve. Rather, what God was doing was merely
foretelling what was going to be the fate of Eve and of women in general outside of Paradise.
Locke was most insistent on this point, making it clear that when he acknowledged that Adam
attained a superiority over Eve, at the time of the Fall, by superiority he did not mean that God
made Adam Eve's superior and thus she his subordinate but rather that Adam attained some
form of material advantage as a consequence of the greater disadvantages that were imposed on
Eve. Adam, in other words, gained a greater capacity to undertake certain activities than that
enjoyed by Eve, as a consequence of her receiving a greater punishment. He did not, however,
thereby gain the right to rule over her.
God, in this text, gives not, that I see, any authority to Adam over Eve, or
to men over their wives, but only foretells what should be the woman's
lot, how by this providence he would order it so that she should be subject
to her husband, as we see that generally the laws of mankind and customs
of nations have ordered it so (Locke 1969:37).

Having made the point that Adam had not been given a divine right to rule Eve, Locke
immediately moved to reassure his readers that husbands would normally be the senior partner
within marriage. Male seniority within this institution, even if not justified by right of
inheritance from Adam, was to be expected because there existed 'a foundation in nature for it.'

For Locke this natural foundation was the fact that the advantage men accidently attained over
women at the time of the banishment from Paradise rendered women the 'weaker sex'. It was
this critical fact, he observed, that tended to ensure that in the vast majority of cases men were
able to attain a superior position in their relations with women. That he believed men's superior
social position was founded on this natural base Locke reaffirmed when discussing how
disputes between husband and wife, over common family problems would normally tend to be
resolved. He argued that in most cases decision-making power in the family would accrue to
the husband in the last instance because of his greater natural abilities and strengths.
But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet
having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different
wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination - i.e., the
rule - should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man's share, as
the abler and stronger (Locke 1969:161).
Fundamental to Locke's explanation and justification for women's subordination to men
then, was the claim that males have greater innate abilities and strengths than do women. Men's
superior social position was based, in the final instance, not on any social arrangement such as
the theoretical and ideological separation of home and civil society, as has been argued by FoxGenovese (1977) and Nicholson (1986), but rather it was established on this 'foundation in
nature'. Locke (1969:37) concedes that 'the laws of mankind and customs of nations have
ordered it so' that wives should be subject to their husbands but he does not locate the
fundamental cause of women's subordination in these social constructs. These laws and
customs merely reinforce the underlying factor upon which men's superior social position is
based and this factor, he insists, is women's relative weakness and the source of this lesser
strength is located in nature not in society.
Locke failed in the Two Treatises to specify in what ways he regarded women as being
weaker than men. Most observers have interpreted his meaning, however, as referring to
physical capacities rather than mental strengths (Clark 1979). This interpretation would appear
to be justified given the evidence that can be gathered from Locke's other writings where he
indicates that he considered women to be men's spiritual and intellectual equals. Michel
(1978:39) has observed that, in the late seventeenth century this would have been a most

radical hypothesis to adopt, for the claim 'that women were weaker than men, in both mind and
body' was generally accepted as a given by the population of England. Though in the process
of being challenged, the ideas of Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen regarding women's
physiological and mental capacities continued to remain influential. These classical scholars
had argued that the male constitution was dry and warm while the female's was humid and
cold. These innate differences between men and women were considered of critical importance
in the formation of the relative abilities of the two sexes. This was because it was believed that
while 'men's heat melted their fat and 'concocted the Humours' into good and proper aliment,
women were left fat and sluggish — in mind as well as in body' by their greater humidity and
lower temperature (Michel 1978:40).
The fact that the population in general accepted women's intellectual and physical
weakness is not evidence that a radical thinker such as Locke shared these views. Through the
seventeenth century the empiricism associated with the scientific revolution then gathering
momentum throughout Europe undermined the acceptance of many of the claims of the classical
theorists. At the same time, however, the empiricists continued to accept many of the ideas of
these individuals. Indeed, in certain instances, by the use of empiricism, they confirmed
particular claims made in the classical writings. Not the least of the ideas that were either
undermined or confirmed by the empiricists related to the intellectual and physical capacities of
males and females. The idea that women were naturally the intellectual inferiors of men, for
example, began to be challenged by an increasing number of empiricists in the second half of
the seventeenth century, this development being best exemplified in Mary Astell's proposals for
the reform of the education system to make it more accessible for girls (Smith 1916; Nadelhaft
1982).
Locke was a committed advocate and a leading theorist of the new empiricism in
science. His contribution to the development of modem empiricism, however, was not limited
to philosophical theorising. In his role as a medical practitioner he worked with many of the
leading medical empiricists of his day. He was consequently well versed in the debates
regarding women's physiological and mental capacities (Dewhurst 1984). His knowledge of
these topics, moreover, was strengthened by the intellectual and personal relationships he

maintained with a number of the leading feminist scholars of his day. From 1691 until his death
in 1704, for example, he lived in the home of Damaris, a woman whom Laslett (1953:536) has
suggested could justifiably be described as 'the first bluestocking of them all'. In her Thoughts
on Education published in 1675 Masham had 'castigated those English gentlemen, who,
destitute of knowledge themselves, derived a sense of superiority from depriving women of
knowledge' (Butler 1978:149). Smith (1916:110) has argued that these two scholars had a
marked influence upon each other. As a result of the relationship, Locke appears to have gained
an enhanced appreciation of the progress of theological debate that had occurred in England
during his period of exile in Holland. She, in turn, moved somewhat towards utilitarianism and
became more radical in her liberalism as a consequence of his influence. There is also some
evidence to suggest that Locke assisted Masham in a pamphlet debate she undertook with her
fellow feminist educational theorist Mary Astell, over the question of the love of God. While
having difficulty embracing some aspects of his political radicalism and religious ideas, Smith
reports that both Astell and Masham were deeply influenced by Locke in their subsequent
writings. The former in 1700 published a pamphlet, Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a
Virtuous Christian Life in which she feminized Locke's ideas on education. Likewise, Masham
utilised both Locke's argument that God had not condemned Eve to perpetual subservience and
his claim that absolutism was unacceptable in both the domestic and the civil sphere to advance
the cause of women in her Reflections Upon Marriage. Both of these women moreover, were
particularly influenced by Locke's discussion in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding
of the connection between experience and self knowledge and his arguments concerning innate
ideas. Consequently, both must be considered as being amongst the first of those Restoration
and eighteenth century women who, O'Donnell (1979:151) has argued, drew inspiration from
Locke's ideas and were thereby helped to 'recognize themselves as rational beings whose
minds should be exercised and developed.'
Locke appears then to have accepted the validity of the claim that women were rational
and had a high level of intellectual capacity. Indeed, unlike the majority of his Whig peers he
believed that females had sufficient intelligence to justify an all but identical educational
programmes for both sexes. In his writings on the education of children Locke argued that only

minimal changes needed to be made to the curriculum he advocated for boys in order to make it
equally suitable for girls. These latter changes primarily related to the physical side of the
curriculum and essentially involved the need to take into consideration the greater desire of girls
to protect their complexions. As far as mental development was concerned Locke suggested that
an identical curriculum be utilised for the education of both girls and boys (Locke 1927:102103).
While his empiricism and his belief in the rationality of human beings may have led
Locke to question the claims of the classical theorists as regards the natural intelligence and
rationality of women, these factors did not lead him to reject certain of the other beliefs
regarding sexual dimorphism handed down from antiquity. Most importantly, empiricism did
not lead him to question the classicists' belief that women were physically weaker than men. In
his medical writings he advised women that the lifting of heavy weights was an activity which
'belongs not to their sex' it being a danger to their physical wellbeing to undertake such
activities (Locke 1954:95-98). That empiricism would not have induced Locke to question
women’s claimed relative physical weakness is understandable because the evidence produced
by this method even today shows that it is the case that women on average are decidedly weaker
than men. Where the physical strength of equally trained men and women has been compared it
has been found that on average women have only some 65% of the muscular capacity available
to adult males (Snook and Ciriello 1974).
It would appear then, that when Locke stated that women were the weaker sex he was
not referring to their innate intelligence but to their physical capacities. That he chose to
emphasise physical strength as a factor both explaining and justifying men's senior position
within the home has caused Locke to be the subject of some criticism by feminist writers. It has
been argued that to suggest that husbands should have a precedence in the making of decisions
within the family, because they have greater muscular strength, is to condone the rule of
'beasts', i.e. it is to imply that husbands have the right to dominate their wives simply because
they have sufficient physical power to compel obedience (Clark 1979:19; Shanley 1982:94).
The laying of such a charge, however, indicates a failure to understand Locke’s argument.
Unlike many of his contemporaries Locke never suggested that a husband has the right to

compel obedience from his wife by the use of terror or violence. It is true that he argued that
men do have the right to insist that their marriage partners pay due heed to their greater strength
and give this attribute due consideration in the shaping of the marriage relationship. This is not,
however, because the man has the right to use his greater physical power to compel his wife to
consent to his will by threatening her with violence. No one, Locke (1969:121,124) insisted,
has the right to use force to compel another human being to do their bidding. Rather, for Locke,
why men's greater strength is important is because it is a property of some significant utility.
Consequently, as with any other attribute or resource that either partner brings to the marriage
relationship, men have the right to require that to the extent that their greater strength is of value
this fact be taken into consideration in the determination of the provisions of the marriage
contract. A man's strength is a property which belongs to the man and the benefits of which
belong to him. If wives wish to share in the material rewards that Locke believed men's
muscular capacity enabled them to generate he considered it reasonable that men ask a price for
this concession.

Equally, he insisted a woman would have the right to require that a

prospective husband take note of those attributes she brought to the relationship.

L ocke’s Theory o f Property
To comprehend Locke's argument regarding the respective status of husband and wife it
is necessary to understand his theory of the origin of private property, his justification for the
uneven distribution of property within society and his understanding of the relationship that
would normally exist between property owners who choose to forge a partnership. As
suggested earlier, to reply adequately to the challenge thrown down by Filmer it was necessary
for Locke not only to advance a defence for male superiority it was also necessary for him to
show concomitantly how private property could be compatible with natural law given that God
had granted the world to mankind in common. This had to be done without resorting to some
mythical mass meeting which had been attended by the whole human race. Locke needed,
moreover, to make his argument attractive to as wide a proportion of the electorate as possible.
This meant his defence of property had to appeal both to the owners of wealth and to those
voters with relatively modest economic resources. Locke's means of achieving these various

objectives was to argue that by the term property he meant not only goods but all use-values
which may be possessed by an individual, be they corporeal or spiritual. He is explicit on this
point insisting; 'By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that
property which men have in their persons as well as goods (Locke 1969:210).' The use-values
within an individual's person to which he refers in particular, are their life, liberty and their
capacity to labour. For Locke the common feature of both these non-physical use-values and of
goods is that their existence is critical to the preservation of human life none being necessarily
more so than another. As the taking of human life is prohibited by natural law, except where
individuals have placed themselves in a state of war with society, the arbitrary expropriation of
any of these forms of property is a threat to human life and hence an infringement of natural
law. Indeed, some types of property are so critical to the preservation of human life the
individual cannot contract to give them away even if they freely wish to do so. Thus
individuals cannot sell themselves into slavery for to be a slave would be to lose one's personal
freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, a freedom 'so necessary to and closely joined with a
man's preservation that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preservation and life
together' (Locke 1969:132) . The existence of this natural law restriction on the nature of
contracts was a critical point for Locke for it meant that the people, when forging the original
covenant which created the state and granted a particular individual the right to be regent, could
not have thereby granted this person the absolute powers claimed by the Royalists. The natural
law command that people preserve human life and hence their liberty meant that individuals had
never had total power over their own lives and as they did not possess this capacity it followed
that they could never have given this power to another.
[F]or a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact or his
own consent enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute
arbitrary power of another to take away his life when he pleases. Nobody
can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his
own life cannot give another power over it (Locke 1969:132).

Locke's insistence that an individual's liberty is a form of property that is inalienable is
the essential element at the core of his explanation of how a world which had been given to
mankind to be possessed in common could have come to be owned in parts by private

individuals. He notes that the common resources initially granted to humanity by God had little
innate value or ability to ease the convenience of human life. For the world's natural wealth to
be appropriated to the use of human beings, it was necessary for individuals to interact with
nature in a constructive manner, i.e. they must engage in labour. To make clear this point he
utilised the example of acorns observing that while it was true that nature alone could produce
this fruit its capacity to sustain human life cannot be realised unless some person picks the
acorns from the ground and transforms them, by the use of labour, into a form suitable for
human consumption. So significant is the contribution of labour to the creation of wealth, in
Locke's estimation, he suggests that the value of undeveloped natural resources is only onehundredth, possibly only one-thousandth, of the value these same resources can attain when
they are mixed with human labour.
The capacity to labour, Locke argued, is a property inherent in the body of all human
beings, i.e. it is part of one's self. Because this ability is contained within an individual's
person and natural law prohibits an individual contracting to give or sell themselves into the
unrestrained control of another, i.e. into slavery, Locke asserted that it followed that the
capacity to labour must also be a natural form of private property. Having laid down the
principle that the inalienable nature of an individual's liberty necessarily renders their capacity to
labour a form of private property, Locke proceeded to argue that if individuals combine their
labour with any part of the world's commonly owned wealth they, by this act, transform what
was common property into private property. That natural wealth which was common, should
become private when mixed with human labour, Locke suggests, is necessarily the case
because individuals infuse something of themselves into natural resources when they mix them
with their own labour. These resources consequently become part of the individual, and as such
goods that can only be owned by the individual, i.e. they become private property. To reinforce
this argument, Locke added that it was only reasonable that it should be the case that individuals
should be allowed to privately possess resources to which they had applied their labour or
labour-power that they had purchased from others given the extent to which the value of such
resources is enhanced by being mixed with labour. In terms of value, the worth of resources
so transformed, Locke (1969:142-143) suggests, is barely more than the congealed labour they

subsequently contain and this no matter how many levels of transformation they may pass
through. Given this situation it is only fair that the individual to whom the labour belonged
should own the resource.
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but
himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say,
are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature
hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property (Locke
1947:134).

Locke argued, moreover, that reason decreed that natural law did not demand that
people gain the consent of all mankind before utilising their labour to appropriate, for private
use, part of the common natural wealth. One does not ask mankind's permission before first
beginning to breathe the common air and thus convert what is a common resource to one's
private use. Indeed to choose to do so would contravene the natural law decree that individuals
preserve human life because it would allow people to die when the wherewithal for their
survival was at hand. In other words natural law not only concedes people the right to
appropriate what was common to their personal ownership, but to the extent that private
appropriation enables people to physically survive, natural law actually demands that this be
done.
Having shown the existence of private property, in a world that had been given to
humanity in common, to be consistent with natural law and consent theory, Locke proceeded to
explain and justify the uneven distribution of private property amongst the population. Again, it
is possible to see here his need to appeal both to the property owning gentry as well as to that
section of the population who found attractive the belief that there existed within the human race
a natural equality. Locke resolved both these needs by arguing that while he believed that all
rational members of the human race were equal by nature he did not mean by this that people
are equal in all respects. He is explicit as regards this point, taking care to ensure he is not
misinterpreted.

Though I have said ... 'that all men by nature are equal,' I cannot be
supposed to understand all sorts of equality. Age or virtue may give men a
just precedency; excellency of parts and merit may place others above the
common level; birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to
pay an observance to those whom nature, gratitude, or other respects may
have made it due; and yet all this consists with the equality which all men
are in, in respect of jurisdiction or domination one over another, which
was the equality I there spoke of as proper to the business in hand, being
that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom, without being
subjected to the will or authority of any other man (Locke 1969:147).

The equality to which Locke refers, in other words, is not an equality of goods or
attributes but rather it is the equal right of all rational individuals to be free of the arbitrary
domination of another. People have the unquestioned equal right to this freedom but at the same
time they have the right to enjoy greater status and precedence in decision making if their
biological capacities, endeavour or social position has provided them with some material
advantage that makes it possible for them to lawfully gain these rewards. In other words, there
can be equality between individuals in certain areas of social life without there necessarily being
equality in others. All may have equal right to sleep under bridges or the right to life itself but
be unequal in any other number of respects.
The fact that human capacities and levels of initiative are not distributed evenly through
the population, Locke argued, meant that some individuals could labour more productively than
could others. While the world remained the common property of all humanity with all entitled to
an equal share of the world's wealth, individuals who had above average abilities were
prohibited from utilising these capacities to increase their share of the world’s wealth by the
natural law provision that they only appropriate, to their private ownership, an equal share of
these resources. Given mankind collectively owned the earth, however, it was not necessary
that they retain this equality of ownership if the people decided unanimously that they no longer
wished to do so. If they so desired, the people could collectively choose to abandon equality of
ownership and adopt some other pattern of resource distribution. As noted above, however, to
sustain this position in the face of Filmer's challenge it was necessary for Locke to explain how
such a decision could had ever been reached. Locke's method of dealing with this fundamental
problem was to lay aside the claim that the uneven division of the world's economic resources

was a consequence of a unanimous decision taken at a mass meeting attended by the whole of
humanity. In the place of this mythical meeting and the voicing of overt consent by its
participants he substituted the market and tacit consent by all people. Humanity, he argued, had
chosen to divide the world disproportionately but its method of taking this decision was not to
meet together and vote directly on the issue. Rather, the people had adopted the use of an
instrument which would enable them to vote on this topic without ever having to meet. This
marvellous instrument was money and the system of economic distribution the people had
chosen was not equal wealth for all but the allocation of resources on the basis of individual
capacities and levels of industriousness. The evidence that the decision to abandon equality of
economic ownership had been taken freely, tacit though the choice may have been, was the fact
that rare durable metals, notably gold and silver had been chosen as the primary instrument of
exchange. Money in this form, Locke observed, had little intrinsic capacity to sustain human
life compared to such things as food and clothing. It had, however, the important characteristic
that there was no limit to the extent to which it could be accumulated and stored. This was
because there was no danger that it would lose its value through physical deterioration.
Apart from this capacity to act as a limitless, non-perishable store of wealth, Locke observed,
gold and silver had little utility. Even so, the people had chosen to elevate these particular
elements to the status of money. Locke suggested that this indicated that the people had
decided that the one characteristic of money they valued above all others was its ability to be
amassed without limit. The fact that they had chosen durable metals as the primary money
form, then, was a clear indication that the people had elected to support the right of the
individual to pursue the unlimited accumulation of wealth. Moreover, it clearly indicated that the
people had also chosen to support the uneven distribution of the world's resources for, Locke
argued, this was an inevitable result of allowing people with differing abilities and capacities to
accumulate wealth without limit.
And thus came in the use of money - some lasting thing that men might
keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in
exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life... And as
different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different
proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to
continue and enlarge them; (Locke 1969:144).

That the people had chosen as money, commodities that had little intrinsic utility apart
from their capacity to act as a store of value was also important, Locke argued, in that it showed
that the decision to adopt these commodities as the primary form of exchange must have been
taken freely. This followed from the fact that despite gold and silver having little direct capacity
to sustain human life people were willing to accept these metals as payment for goods which
had a more direct capacity to aid survival. Their acceptability as a means of exchange rested, in
other words, not on any life sustaining capacity but on the fact that people chose to give value
to these otherwise relatively useless commodities. This was an exercise in free choice for
people were free to refuse to accept this form of payment if they wished. If they chose not to
accept money as a form of payment their survival was not endangered and so the fact that they
did indicated they did so freely.

Finally, there remains the question of why Locke believed

people would have chosen to give up the security provided by the limitation on accumulation,
with its assurance of equality for all, in exchange for the right to accumulate unlimited wealth.
The latter freedom, he made clear, could only be had at the cost of forgoing the security
associated with economic equality. There was, in other words, a decided opportunity cost in
choosing to abandon equality of goods for equality of opportunity. Locke's explanation for
why the human race would have opted for the second of these options even if this was at the
cost of the other was founded on his belief that nature 'has put into man a desire of happiness
and an aversion to misery (Locke 1961:27)'. Consequently, individuals faced with a choice
between two goods would always take that which gave the greatest utility - 'for no rational
creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse' (Locke
1969:186; Brogan 1959). Locke's explanation for why humanity had chosen opportunity over
security then, was that the people had decided that by so doing their overall utility would be
maximised.

Relations Between Property Owners
By developing his theory of the origin of property Locke successfully countered
Filmer's accusation that the consent theories had no logical explanation for how the world could
have come to be divided into private lots. Having achieved this objective without the need of a
mythical meeting of all humanity, it was a relatively small step for Locke to then invent the
property-defending state. All that was now required for a government to be created was for the
property owners of a region to gether together and decide that they could pass certain of their
powers over to a collective body. Such an act did not contravene natural law. This was
because it was only the property of the individuals involved that was being placed under the
protection of a government and what was done with the individual's property only its owners
had a natural law right to determine.
Having justified property rights and the existence of the state Locke proceeded to
discuss the nature of relations between property owners. A useful aspect of this part of the
Two Treatises was his explanation of why employers normally enjoyed a precedence in
decision-making over employees. There are three reasons why it is useful to examine this
issue in a paper on Locke's contribution to the women's question. First, doing so helps to
make clear his understanding of relatons between the sexes. Second, it highlights the fact that
Locke was consistent in his understanding of relations between individuals who form a
partnership. Third, it enables one to see that apart from allowing for the need to protect any
children that were a consequence of a marriage partnership, Locke did not apply different
standards to his analysis of the social position of men and women.
Given his belief that all individuals are property owners even if the property they
possess is no more than their life, liberty and their capacity to labour, all relationships formed to
promote a common endeavour are, for Locke, partnerships between property owners. The
relationship between the buyer and seller of labour-time normally involves the creation of such
a partnership because the successful exchange of commodities belonging to employer and
employee normally requires a sustained period to be achieved. As with any other partnership,
Locke accepted that the employment relationship should be founded on a freely negotiated
contract. What provisions the partners chose to include in this contract was entirely up to the

individuals involved save only that they ensure that these provisions comply with the law.
Where no civil law exists this means only that they comply with natural law. Locke suggested
that in the case of the employment contract natural law demanded first, that the contract not exist
in perpetuity, (for a person would be thereby selling away their freedom); second, that the
provisions of the contract be not subject to arbitrary modification during its lifetime. (Locke
1969:162).
Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far
different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another by
selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do in exchange
for wages he is to receive; and though this commonly puts him into the
family of his master and under the ordinary discipline thereof, yet it gives
the master but a temporary power over him and no greater that what is
contained in the contract between them (Locke 1969:162).

Locke accepted that when human beings negotiate an employment contract, employer
and employee meet as free agents who are equals in terms of their respective freedom from
arbitrary domination by any other. From this particular perspective these individuals are equals
irrespective of what level of inequality may exist in other areas. Consequently, any contract
forged between them to facilitate the exchange of their respective commodities is a contract
between equals. If viewed broadly, it is of course ludicrous to suggest that employers and
employees normally bargain as equals. Employers generally have access to greater resources
than do employees. They also tend to have a lesser degree of immediate need for the
employee's services than the latter tend to have for that offered by the employer. That Locke
was well aware that this was the normal situation is shown by his recognition of the fact that
within the employment relationship the common arrangement was one of superior and
subordinate. He accepted, in other words, that normally the employer was conceded authority
over the relationship by the employee. Given they were equals in terms of their natural
freedoms, according to Locke, the only way the employer could justifiably gain such a position
was if the employee consented voluntarily to this arrangement. For Locke a voluntary
agreement was one in which consent was not extracted by the use of coercion. It did not,
however, preclude the possibility that only one of the contractors might have a strong motive
for entering the arrangement. If a prospective partner's level of need for the commodity offered

by the other was unequal this did not negate the fact that the choice of each to enter the
partnership was a voluntary act. As Dunn (1967:157) has put it, for Locke: 'Voluntary action
does not, of course, imply the absence of motive, even of overwhelmingly powerful motive.'
Where bargainers who are negotiating a trade of commodities have differing levels of
need for the goods or services being offered in exchange there is a likelihood that this fact will
be manifested in the final terms of the agreement. If, for example, all the land of a region is in
private hands and there is an overabundance of available landless labour motivated to enter an
employment relationship by the need to eat, it can be expected that these facts will be reflected
in the wage paid to the employee for his or her labour-power. It is also reasonable to assume
that where the exchange process requires the creation of a partnership the bargainer with the
lesser degree of need is likely to come out of the bargaining process with the more
advantageous or senior position. Locke accepted that both these probable consequences of
unequal need amongst bargainers would characterise the employment relationship. Unequal
distribution of land, he accepted, commonly enabled landowners who entered into partnerships
with those without sufficient resources to enable them to survive independently, to extract a
surplus from the employee or tenant. Thus, Locke argued, uneven distribution of land or
money facilitates the transfer of what 'was the reward of one man's labour into another man's
pocket (Locke 1740:19).' Locke also accepted that the employee would normally be under the
'ordinary discipline' of the employer, i.e. the employer would be the boss. In other words,
because of their greater bargaining power employers would normally receive more from the
employee than they paid and be accorded a 'just precedency' over those 'things of their
common interest and property'. Given the bargainers were free agents hypothetically this was
not how things had to be. These individuals were free to establish alternative arrangements if
they wished, but for Locke it was to be expected that the common arrangement would be that
the employer's advantageous position would enable the extraction of a surplus and the
employer would be the senior partner.
Locke applied the principles utilised in his analysis of the employment contract to his
discussion of a number of other social covenants. Not the least of these was the marriage
partnership. Here, once again, we are presented with two free individuals who are equals in

terms of their natural freedoms. By a process of negotiation these individuals forge a contract,
the provisions of which are constrained only by natural law and if in civil society by those laws
of the state which are consistent with natural law. That there should be an equality between
prospective marriage partners was normally accepted as a given by consent theorists. Their
conception of what this equality necessarily involved, however, was very limited in nature.
Grotius (1925:234) and Pufendorf (1927:95), for example, limited women's natural conjugal
freedom merely to the right to choose whom to marry. These men presumed that the husband's
absolute authority in the marriage was a necessary condition of the relationship. Locke, on the
other hand, argued that 'the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the
condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state (Locke
1969:161)'.
To argue that women retained their natural freedoms after marriage and that men had no
God-given right to dominate the marriage relationship was a very radical hypothesis for
seventeenth century England. It was an implicit criticism of those civil laws which constrained
women's freedoms and it held up a model of what should be, which was not to become legal
fact for another two centuries. Why Locke adopted this radical posture is a matter of conjecture.
It should be noted, though, that to accept the alternative, i.e. the claim that husbands had a
natural right to a dominant position within marriage, would have undermined his argument that
Eve was not Adam's natural subordinate. This, in turn, would have destroyed his thesis that
regents could not base their absolutist claims on the supposed absolute powers that had been
given by God to Adam. To sustain his position, as regards the King's claims, Locke needed to
argue that wives and husbands were free to arrange their relationships as they wished.
Acknowledging that Locke was in a situation where the denial of women's natural
equality was difficult to render compatible with his political needs, however, is not to suggest
that he adopted this position merely because he had no choice. To do so would be to unjustly
deny him the moral credit he deserves for challenging the received wisdom. His friend James
Tyrrell (1681:14,110) when faced with this same difficulty could not bring himself to accept
women's equality as could very few of Locke's other Whig contemporaries. For Tyrrell the
physical and mental weakness that he believed characterised the female sex meant that women

would necessarily have to accept that they would be 'as a slave' to their husbands once they
were married. It is therefore to Locke's credit that when faced with this situation he maintained
consistency and insisted that women's natural rights were no less than those that belonged to
men and that marriage could not constitute a forfeiture of these rights. Locke accepted that
wives would normally be the lesser partner in the marriage relationship and he accepted this
situation as reasonable, it is true, but his reasons for doing so were not inherently sexist. By
this is meant he did not utilise differing criteria for explaining the nature and assessing the
justice of relations between men and women than he applied to those between men.
Locke's explanation and justification for why men were normally the senior partner in
marriage was the same as his explanation for why the employer was normally the boss. In
short, men's greater strength and consequent abilities enabled them to negotiate a superior
position with their prospective brides. As did employees, women consented to this lesser
position because they accepted that this was a cost that they had to pay for economic security.
Again,

as with the employment relationship, Locke insisted that there was nothing inherent in

marriage that demanded that one or other of the partners had to have the senior position.
Marriage partners were free to negotiate different terms to their contract if they wished. The
only concessions to the uniqueness of the marriage contract that Locke was willing to concede
was that it had to be compatible with the attainment of the primary purpose of marriage, i.e.
'the continuation of the species.' This meant first, that the marriage partners had to agree that
both would have right of access to the body of the other for purposes of procreation. Second,
both had to agree to remain with the other for at least as long as was required to enable their
common offspring to reach an age where they could fend for themselves. Third, both had to
agree to provide the degree of support and assistance required to ensure the children gained
adequate nurturing. Beyond these necessary provisions there were no natural restrictions which
the partners had to agree to include in their covenant.

Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it [i.e. husbands
having the right to dominate the marriage relationship]; nay, community of
goods and the power over them, mutual assistance, and other things
belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that
contract which unites man and wife in that society as far as may consist
with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for
themselves, nothing being necessary to any society that is not necessary to
the ends for which it is made (Locke 1969:161-162).

Or as Shanley (1982:93) has put it:
Beginning from the premises that the end of marriage is the
procreation and nurture of children and that marriage is a contractual
relationship, Locke concluded that husband and wife might set
whatever terms they wished to their relationship as long as these
were conducive to the care of the young.
For Locke then, the same restrictions and freedoms applied to the marriage contract as
applied to any other covenant. Most importantly, the property rights of both partners, both
corporeal and spiritual, could not be arbitrarily infringed. Consequently, just as a people could
not grant the state absolute power over their property, a wife could not grant her husband the
right to absolute authority over her life even if she so wished. To do so would alienate a
property she has not the power to give away. Nor may a man confiscate for his own use the
goods a woman brings to the marriage merely because the couple have chosen to marry. This
was her property and hence part of her being and as such could not be expropriated against her
will. For Locke the marriage relationship created no theoretical difficulties with these forms of
property. There was, however, a theoretical problem with property which a husband and wife,
by common endeavour, might accumulate during the period of the marriage. As this wealth
was the product of their common labours the husband could have no right to arbitrarily utilise it
as he wished. 'For as to the wife's share, whether her own labour or compact gave her a title to
it, it is plain her husband could not forfeit what was hers (Locke 1969:216).' This left
unresolved, however, how the day to day decision making as to the use of this common
property was to be determined. It was here that Locke observed that as the male was the 'abler
and stronger’ of the two sexes, familial decision making power, in the last instance, tended
'naturally' to fall to the husband. This development, it needs to be stressed, Locke believed was

a tendency not a universal phenomenon. He was quite explicit that it was not the case that
husbands must inevitably have final decision making power in the family. Indeed, he scoffed at
those who suggested that marriage conveyed this right on husbands. When doing so he pointed
out that within England no one accepted that a queen who married one of her subjects
consequently became the subordinate of this individual (Locke 1969:37). Locke observed,
moreover, that even while it was true that the power of ultimate decision over common goods
normally fell to the husband this was not the way things had to be. 'Community of goods and
the power over them' within marriage, he insisted, could be varied and regulated as the
marriage partners wished, the only proviso being that the interests of any offspring be protected
(Locke 1969:162). Finally, Locke observed that even the tendency for men to be the senior
partner in marriage was limited in nature. The rights men's supposed greater abilities and
strengths might convey were strictly limited, for the husband could not make any claim on that
which was the wife's personal property. Nor could these capacities enable the man to claim any
more right over her life than she had over his. Indeed, if the husband attempted to infringe these
basic rights, Locke insisted, the wife was perfectly at liberty to appeal to the state to protect her
interests, separate or even divorce.
Pateman (1987:106) has denied that Locke accepted that both men and women had an
equal right to be free of subjugation by any other. He could not have done so, she insists,
because he accepts that women are natural subordinates and a 'natural subordinate cannot at the
same time be free and equal'. Pateman, however, misses Locke's point that there can be
equality between individuals in certain areas of social life without there necessarily being
equality in all others. It was, moreover, not the case that Locke depicted women as men's
'natural subordinates' in the Two Treatises. Indeed, as has been shown it was critical for his
refutation of absolutism that any claim that husbands had a natural right to dominate their wives
be denied. Even if he believed that this was the case, therefore, Locke could not have conceded
that women were the natural subordinates of men. As has been shown this is not to suggest that
Locke did not accept that men would normally be the dominant partner in the marriage
relationship. His explanation for this, however, lay not in any concession to women's
supposed natural subordination. Rather, it lay in his theory of property and his understanding

of the relationship that would normally exist between property owners who have differing
levels of need for each others services but who choose, nonetheless, to forge a partnership.
What Locke argued, in short, was that men commonly enjoyed a natural advantage
when bargaining over the provisions of the marriage partnership as a consequence of the fact
that women were physically the weaker sex. Men's greater strength was an advantage because
it enabled them to undertake certain significant manual tasks much more effectively than could
women. Consequently, because most men had this overall advantage Locke accepted that, just
as the employer commonly had the ability to negotiate the senior position within the
employment relationship, because of their greater attributes, prospective husbands normally
had the capacity to negotiate a superior position within marriage.
What made the strength advantage important, in the shaping of relations between the
sexes then, was for Locke not that it gave men the capacity to terrorise women but that it gave
them a greater ability to undertake those specific activities which required high levels of
physical capacity. In seventeenth century England two fundamental activities which would
have fallen within this category were soldiering and certain types of productive labour.
Traditionally, the first had been of great importance amongst the ruling strata. The significance
of this factor had, however, declined greatly since the period of high feudalism when the rulers
had in effect been a military class. Even so, despite its diminished significance the respective
military capacities of the sexes remained a significant factor influencing the ideological
perspective of those who were members of the dominant sector. Much more significant for the
overwhelming bulk of this agrarian population, however, would have been the extent to which
the differing muscular capacities of the sexes would have influenced their respective ability to
undertake heavy manual labour. That Locke might have believed that this factor could enable
the majority of husbands to gain a negotiated precedence in their relations with their wives has
been denied by Clark (1979:31) on the grounds that women are 'as able to labour as men.' The
point is, however, that where certain types of work were concerned, this being work where
physical strength was a highly significant factor influencing the individual worker's
productivity, Locke did not accept that the sexes had an equal ability to labour. He believed that

heavy physical work was an activity, a 'stress of labour', which women were less capable of
undertaking than were men (Locke 1954:490).
Whether or not Locke was correct in his belief as regards the respective labouring
abilities of the sexes is a debatable point. It should be noted, though, that those historians who
have studied this specific issue have reported that the hypothesis was widely held in
seventeenth century England and that there tends to be substantive evidence to suggest there
was some truth in the claim (Roberts 1979; Snell 1981; Middleton 1988). Irrespective of the
validity of Locke's hypothesis, however, what is clear is that he believed it to be the case that
women's lesser physical strength rendered them less capable than were men of undertaking
heavy physical labour. That this was so is important, for it enables us to comprehend how
Locke could come to believe that men would tend normally to come out of the negotiations over
the conditions of the marriage partnership as the senior partner. Locke lived in a society where
the economic security of the overwhelming majority of families was greatly dependent on the
capacity of its members to periodically undertake heavy physical labour. Indeed, even the
livelihood of the gentry and the aristocracy, classes which did not actually engage in manual
labour, was partially dependent on this ability. That this was so was because the mass of
surplus value these classes could extract from employees or tenants, was influenced by the
level of labour productivity of the direct producers. Believing that men's greater muscular
capacity gave them an enhanced ability to undertake manual labour would, in such a situation,
amount to accepting that the majority of men entered the negotiations over the provisions of the
marriage contract with a decided economic advantage. Locke does not appear to have believed
that women had any natural economic attribute which might be an as effective bargaining tool as
that which he accepted was enjoyed by men. Consequently, he could rationally conclude males
entered these negotiations with a lesser need for that which women had to offer than the need
women had for that which could be offered by men. Both prospective marriage partners could
offer the other sex, companionship, children and productive labour, but the man, because of his
greater physical prowess, could also offer a level of economic security which very few woman
could match. This last being necessarily so unless the woman was amongst that small minority

of the population who owned a significant mass of economic property, other than their ability to
labour, or had a level of physical strength that would be unusual for a female.
In advancing the above hypothesis it needs to be added that given Locke's
understanding of the role played by relative need in the bargaining process, the viability of his
argument did not require men to be more productive than women in all types of work. Indeed,
even if it was the case that wives were more productive than were husbands overall and
consequently contributed more to the home than did their spouses Locke theoretically might still
have been able to accept that most men could be able to negotiate a superior position in the
marriage relationship. Whether this could be done would depend on how critical to survival
were the tasks requiring high levels of physical strength. In other words men might be able to
extract a reward in the form of a rent from the fact that strength was unevenly distributed
between the sexes. If survival of the wife required access to the physical strength that was
largely a natural monopoly of men but there was nothing that she possessed that was equally
needed for his survival, then the man has a decided advantage in the determination of the
provisions of any partnership which they may form to promote their joint interests. In short,
given his understanding of the bargaining process Locke could accept that common sense
would decree that in such a situation the woman was likely to come out of the bargaining
process promising to honour and obey while he merely promised to keep her in sickness and in
health.

C on clu sion
In his reply to Filmer, Locke sought to contribute to the undermining of political
absolutism by disabusing those who feared that to deny the King's claim that his power was
derived from God was to undermine political stability, property rights and men's authority
within the home. In seeking to achieve this objective Locke advanced an explanation for male
superiority, which, while conceding that husbands normally enjoyed a position of seniority in
their relations with their wives, rejected the claim that men’s superior position was divinely
sanctioned or was part of their birthright. By so doing Locke aided women to free themselves
from the binds of a theological determinism which decreed that they were forever fated to a

condition of subservience to men. Given the extent to which religion and the story of Adam and
Eve had traditionally shaped peoples' view as to the 'correct' relationship between men and
women, this was no mean feat. As O'Donnell has observed, to undermine this perspective as
did Locke was a contribution of great significance to the efforts of those who insisted that in
terms of spirituality, rationality and intelligence women were the equals of men and thus entitled
to the same rights as men.
The Christian patriarchal political and cultural system - whereby every
avenue of power within society is in male hands - is ideologically rooted in
the story of Adam and Eve. The birthright priority whereby males rule
females, the innate distinctions presumed to fit males for domination and
females for submission, is contained within the story. In the deepest sense,
Adam's mastery of Eve precludes her claims to autonomous identity,
while Adam's God-given power to name the creatures of the earth insures
his right to define Eve with his own words. Locke's empiricism
undercuts the story ... because it insists that the human mind become
aware of itself and its own powers.
In the place of the theological argument advanced by the absolutist theorists Locke substituted
an economic argument which, while it retained links to theology, took debate far down the
secular path which the economics discipline was eventually to follow. In the process Locke
helped to lay down the foundations upon which subsequent debate on the social position of
women was to be based. Contract, bargaining, relative productivity, utility and opportunity
cost, these were the critical elements in Locke's explanation for men's superior social position.
In the bargaining process women, acting as free agents, conceded men a precedence in the
marriage contract because women recognised that their ability to produce the material
wherewithal needed for life was less than what could be had by forming a marriage partnership
with a man, a partnership which had a cost but the price of which was less than the utility
forgone. Advocates of the new household economics, with their overarching interest in the
nature of intra-family economic relations and the concept of intra-family contracts, might well
recognise a similarity between this argument and some of their own work. Indeed, if they were
to claim Locke as an early advocate of their approach to the study of the family they would be
justified in doing so. Likewise, feminist economists, with their critical approach to the issue of
discrimination might well claim Locke as an early supporter of the right of women to be treated
as equals with men. If they were to do so they would be joining feminist philosophers, such as

Squadrito (1979:10), who even though she fails to comprehend his economics can perceive
Locke's underlying commitment to sexual equality and thus argue:
Relative to his contemporaries Locke took an extremely liberal position on
sexual equality. These views, like most of his work, were considered
radical and dangerous: indeed, some of his ideas about women did not
become respectable until the twentieth century. We cannot rank Locke
among the great fore-mothers of the feminist movement, but we should
accord him his place among those whose insight and courage contributed
to its development.
To some modem readers Locke's thesis has appeared merely as a new justification for
patriarchy. It has been perceived as little more than a construct advanced to enable a traditional
justification for the enslavement of women to be jettisoned while ensuring that women remained
men's subordinates. The traditional argument, it is suggested, was abandoned only because it
had become an obstacle to men's political emancipation. Such a verdict, however, is
unjustified for in the context in which he wrote, i.e. a society which granted the husband total
control of his wife's property and conceded him the right to beat her all but to death, Locke's
work was undoubtedly sexually progressive and emancipatory. It depicted women as beings
who were rational and who were entitled consequently to the natural law rights that
automatically accrued to all rational beings. This meant they had the right freely to possess their
lives, liberties, goods and the product of their labour. It is true that his economic argument gave
justification to women's subordinate status within marriage. At the same time, however, it
provided important theoretical arguments which could and did aid women in their struggle to
free themselves from a theological determinism which condemned them to perpetual
subservience. Moreover, his argument placed an onus on men to justify their demand that they
be given a superior ranking within marriage, rather than merely assuming they should enjoy
this position simply because they were men. It denied husbands and fathers the right to use
violence against females and accorded women the right to strive to find ways to overcome
men's natural advantages. All in all, therefore, Locke's work was a valuable theoretical
contribution to the process of women's emancipation. Certainly, his contribution was a great
advance on a traditional argument which simply stated that God had decreed that women were
subservient to men and this is the way it must always remain.
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